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Abstract: The earliest mention of Melissus of Samos by name is 
found in the first chapter of the Hippocratic De natura hominis. In 
the following note, I attempt to examine what is meant by the 
reference Melissus’ ‘logos’ in this work and suggest, against previous 
accounts, including Galen’s, that it has little to do with his 
commitment to monism. Rather Melissus’ logos is better understood 
as his referring to his strategy for demonstrating such a conclusion, 
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especially his use of a supplemental argument in his fragment B8. 
Polybus’ concern in this first chapter is not monism as such but the 
claims to knowledge monists make. Melissus is a prime example of 
a monist who fails to grasp what he claims to know. 
Keywords: Melissus, Hippocrates, Monism, Eleatics. 
 
 
What is the logos of Melissus? In one respect, at least, this is a 
relatively straightforward question to answer. The verbatim 
fragments of this early Greek philosopher preserved by Simplicius 
and the testimonia that survive indicate that Melissus was an 
advocate of the Eleatic ‘One’, a form of ontological monism that 
rejects change, including alteration, rearrangement and locomotion, 
historically associated with Parmenides and Zeno of Elea. Certainly, 
the accounts of Plato in the Theaetetus (183e-184a) and Aristotle in 
the Physics (1.2-3) strongly connect Melissus with Parmenides, with 
the latter emphasising their shared commitment to the ‘one’ as well 
as their unsound reasoning.1 Melissus’ logos might then simply be 
understood as the book in which he advanced his position or, more 
simply, his commitment to monism, however we are to understand 
this. 
However, it is a more difficult task to isolate how Melissus’ logos 
was understood prior to its fourth-century reception in Plato and 
Aristotle. It has been reasonably, if not definitively, claimed that the 
concept of void, understood as a precondition for motion, in his B7 
was original to Melissus and a significant influence on the atomists.2 
It is also likely that Gorgias’ On What-Is-Not, or On Nature directly 
targeted, perhaps parodically, Melissus’ book, which was entitled On 
 
1 For the relationship between Melissus and Parmenides, see Harriman (2018, p. 1-
23) for some preliminary thoughts. See also Palmer (2004) and Makin (2014). 
2 For discussion of this point, see Harriman (2018, p. 181-193). See also Guthrie 
(1965, p.117–18), Furley (1967, p. 79–103), and Graham (2010, p. 462). I keep to 
the Diels standard of ‘B’ numbers for verbatim fragments for convenience.  
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Nature, or On What-is.3 Yet our evidence permits us merely to note 
these connections as probable. 
However, there is some hope for determining the early impact of 
Melissus. In the following, I set out to examine the earliest 
unambiguous reference to Melissus and his logos, found in the 
Hippocratic treatise De natura hominis.4  This fifth-century work, 
attributed to Hippocrates’ student and son-in-law, Polybus, 
articulates clearly for the first time the theory of the four humours of 
the human being and their relation to the seasons and to health and 
disease.5 Tantalisingly, Melissus’ name and a reference to his logos 
appear in the first chapter of this work in a series of critical remarks 
that are largely methodological in nature and serve to counter what 
Polybus understands as the illicit intrusion of philosophy into 
medicine. How we are to understand the reference is perhaps not 
immediately obvious, but if we could reconstruct how Polybus 
appropriated Melissus and his logos in this work, we might find a 
crucial piece of early evidence for the reception of Melissus and his 
logos prior to Plato. 
The text of first chapter of De natura hominis is worth quoting in full: 
 Ὅστις μὲν οὖν εἴωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ τῆς 
φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπείης προσωτέρω ἢ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐς 
ἰητρικὴν ἀφήκει, τούτῳ μὲν οὐκ ἐπιτήδειος ὅδε ὁ 
λόγος ἀκούειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἠέρα λέγω τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, οὔτε πῦρ, οὔτε ὕδωρ, οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ᾿ 
ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐνεὸν ἐν τῷ 
ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλὰ τοῖσι βουλομένοισι ταῦτα λέγειν 
παρίημι. δοκέουσι μέντοι μοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν 
οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες· γνώμῃ μὲν γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες 
χρέονται, λέγουσι δὲ οὐ ταὐτά· ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν γνώμης 
τὸν ἐπίλογον τὸν αὐτὸν ποιέονται (φασί τε γὰρ ἕν τι 
εἶναι, ὅ τι ἔστι, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν) 
κατὰ δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οὐχ ὁμολογέουσιν· λέγει δ᾿ αὐτῶν 
ὁ μέν τις φάσκων ἠέρα τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, 
 
3 For this point, see Reale (1970, p. 24, n. 97) and Palmer (2009, p. 218–21). 
4 I hope, then, to supplement here some of the tentative remarks on this passage I 
made in Harriman (2018, p. 19-22). 
5 See Jouanna (2012) for a helpful account and overview. 
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ὁ δὲ πῦρ, ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ, ὁ δὲ γῆν, καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἕκαστος τῷ 
ἑωυτοῦ λόγῳ μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια, ἅ ἐστιν οὐδέν. 
ὁπότε δὲ γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ προσχρέονται, λέγουσι δ᾿ οὐ 
τὰ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ γινώσκουσιν αὐτά. γνοίη δ᾿ 
ἂν τόδε τις μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν 
ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ 
αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων 
οὐδέποτε τρὶς ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, 
ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ οὗτος, ποτὲ δὲ 
ᾧ ἂν τύχῃ μάλιστα ἡ γλῶσσα ἐπιρρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν 
ὄχλον. καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν 
ἀμφὶ τῶν πρηγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν 
λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἐόντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς 
ἀποφαίνεται. ἀλλ᾿ ἐμοί γε δοκέουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι 
ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν 
ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ἀσυνεσίης, τὸν δὲ 
Μελίσσου λόγον ὀρθοῦν. 
He who is accustomed to hear speakers discuss the 
nature of man beyond its relations to medicine will not 
find the present account of any interest. For I do not 
say at all that a man is air, or fire, or water, or earth, or 
anything else that is not an obvious constituent of a 
man; such accounts I leave to those that care to give 
them. Those, however, who give them have not in my 
opinion correct knowledge (δοκέουσι μέντοι μοι οὐκ 
ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες). For while 
adopting the same idea they do not give the same 
account. Though they add the same appendix to their 
idea – saying that ‘what is’ is a unity, and that this is 
both unity and the all – yet they are not agreed as to its 
name. One of them asserts that this one and the all is 
air, another calls it fire, another, water, and another, 
earth; while each appends to his own account evidence 
and proofs that amount to nothing. The fact that, while 
adopting the same idea, they do not give the same 
account, shows that their knowledge too is at fault. 
The best way to realise this is to be present at their 
debates. Given the same debaters and the same 
audience, the same man never wins in the discussion 
three times in succession, but now one is victor, now 
another, now he who happens to have the most glib 
tongue in the face of the crowd. Yet it is right that a 
man who claims correct knowledge about the facts 
should maintain his own argument victorious always, 
if his knowledge be knowledge of reality and if he set 
it forth correctly. But in my opinion such men by their 
lack of understanding overthrow themselves in the 
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words of their very discussions, and establish the 
theory of Melissus. 
(De natura hominis chapter 1. Text and trans. Jones 
(1923)) 
Can we determine how the logos of Melissus is to be understood here 
and how the disputants depicted establish it, or set it right (ὀρθοῦν)?6 
Is it, for example, along the same monistic lines as Plato and Aristotle 
would lead us to expect? What one can say at the outset is that 
Polybus is attempting at the start of this work to overthrow those who 
adopt a view of the world which identifies a single element (e.g. air, 
fire, water, or earth) as the sole constituent substance of the human 
and thus those who suggest implicitly or explicitly that a single cure 
might be discovered for disease. 
First let us turn to the ancient reception of Polybus’ strategy in 
Galen’s commentary on De natura hominis. He takes the error 
Polybus diagnoses in his targets’ accounts to be one centred on 
identification. 7  Those who name one specific element of the 
canonical four fail to support their argument; indirectly, then, they 
support Melissus. How so? This is because Galen takes Melissus to 
be a proto-matter theorist who argues for a common (οὐσίαν κοινήν), 
ungenerated (ἀγέννντον), and imperishable (ἄφθαρτον) substance, 
equating roughly to ‘matter’, which underlies the four elements as a 
substrate. 8  The back and forth of the debates Polybus describes 
allegedly indicate that identifying the human person with any one 
element is flawed because the monists are themselves at odds in their 
discussions. The idea, then, is that a more basic commitment to 
something underlying all the elements through change would be more 
plausible and thus support Melissus’ position. 
 
6 For ὀρθοῦν, cf. Iliad XXIII.695, as noted by Jouanna (1965), with Longrigg 
(1993, p.89). 
7  Galen, In Hippocratis de Natura hominis 29-31= Mewaldt-Helmreich-
Westenberger, 1914, p. 17-18. 
8 Jones (1923, p. 4, n.1) seems to follow Galen’s explanation. 
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We might object that this Galenic reading of Melissus 
misunderstands his view of the subject of his treatise—‘what-is’ or 
being—and his elimination of all change and alteration, not just that 
of some foundational, or primary, substance (see his B8). However, 
putting that worry to one side, what we might take away is that Galen 
understands the logos of Melissus to be the core, substantive 
commitment of the philosopher as expounded in his book. It is 
Melissus’ monistic ontology (i.e. his advocacy of invariant being) 
that is purportedly established by Polybus’ disputants in spite of their 
best intentions. If this is right, what we might understand as the core 
commitment of Melissus’ work (i.e. his logos) as portrayed by Plato 
and Aristotle is, in fact, held in common with Polybus. 
That it is Melissus’ monism that Polybus has in mind by his logos is 
similarly assumed by a suggestive account originated by Jouanna, 
and expanded by Longrigg. 9  This reading finds a great deal of 
dialectical subtlety in Polybus’ approach to his targets and an especial 
place for Diogenes of Apollonia as a target. Longrigg’s 
reconstruction of the intellectual context and of the substance of the 
polemic is complex and merits close scrutiny.10 
This approach begins from the striking connection between the words 
that immediately follow Polybus’ mention of Melissus in the first 
chapter of De natura hominis and Diogenes’ B2. 
My view, in general, is that all existing things are 
altered from the same thing and are the same thing. 
And this is manifest: for if the things presently existing 
in this world order: earth, air, fire, and the rest, which 
plainly exist in this world order, if any of these was 
different the one from the other, being other in its own 
nature and not the same as it changed often and 
altered, in no way would it have been able to mix with 
another, neither would benefit nor harm <come to one 
 
9 Jouanna (1965), Longrigg (1993, p. 85-90). 
10 Longrigg casts his account as largely in keeping with Jouanna’s and makes little 
claim to originality. I follow the exposition of the former here, who makes the 
position pellucid. 
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from the other>.Diogenes of Apollonia DK64B2 
(Trans. Graham (2010)). 
But I hold that if man were a unity he would never feel 
pain, as there would be nothing from which a unity 
could suffer pain. And even if he were to suffer, the 
cure too would have to be one. But as a matter of fact 
cures are many. For in the body are many constituents, 
which, by heating, by cooling, by drying or by wetting 
one another contrary to nature, engender diseases. (De 
natura hominis chapter 2, trans. Jones (1923)). 
We find here two arguments, overlapping in form, which make 
diametrically opposed points on the affective quality of any substance 
from the point of view of the monist. Diogenes understands change 
(importantly, including harm (blabe)) as possible only if its 
constituents share a fundamental nature; this is required to allow for 
interaction, understood as mixture. Monism, perhaps counter-
intuitively, is what allows for change. Polybus insists in response that 
such change, exemplified here by pain, could only be possible if there 
were a plurality. Change, on his model, requires plurality. Alteration, 
it is agreed on both sides, entails an interaction between two 
substances. It is the nature of these two (same or different) that is at 
issue. 
How does such a connection with Diogenes establish the logos of 
Melissus? The thought on this interpretation seems to be that 
Melissus’ rejection of pain and anguish in his account of what-is in 
B7 works to confirm Polybus’ criticism of the monists.11 Diogenes 
has maintained that harm could only come about as the product of 
unity. Melissus argued that pain and anguish are incompatible with 
the completeness of what-is understood as a unity. Polybus’ strategy 
then is firmly dialectical: Diogenes’ monistic understanding of the 
mechanism of harm is targeted not using the assumptions of the 
 
11 οὐδὲ ἀλγεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πᾶν εἴη ἀλγέον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο ἀεὶ εἶναι χρῆμα ἀλγέον 
οὐδὲ ἔχει ἴσην δύναμιν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· οὔτ’ ἂν ὅμοιον εἴη, εἰ ἀλγέοι· ἀπογινομένου γάρ τευ 
ἂν ἀλγέοι ἢ προσγινομένου, κοὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὅμοιον εἴη. οὐδ’ ἂν τὸ ὑγιὲς ἀλγῆσαι 
δύναιτο· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἂν ὄλοιτο τὸ ὑγιὲς καὶ τὸ ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γένοιτο. καὶ περὶ τοῦ 
ἀνιᾶσθαι ωὑτὸς λόγος τῷ ἀλγέοντι. 
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pluralist (which might be thought question-begging) but the terms of 
monism itself in the form of Melissus. The sting in the tail, Longrigg 
and Jouanna note, is that Diogenes likely post-dated Melissus and 
presumably thought he had successfully countered the latter’s B7.12 
If this is right, the instability of the monists in their debates, the 
supposed advocates of stability and unity, is to be interpreted in the 
context of Diogenes’ revival of monistic physics in the wake of the 
post-Parmenidean pluralist projects of Empedocles and Anaxagoras. 
Undoubtedly, such an approach to Polybus’ text is dialectically 
sophisticated and sensitive to his intellectual milieu. However, there 
are reasons for scepticism. 
It is plausible, as Jouanna and Longrigg note,13  that Diogenes of 
Apollonia is relevant to Polybus’ strategy in chapter 2, but it is 
unclear that this is also true of the first chapter or of the mention of 
Melissus. It is notable that the beginning of the chapter 2 marks a 
clean break (περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀρκεῖ μοι τὰ εἰρημένα) from what 
has come before. The polemic at the start of the work targets all 
monistic accounts of the constituents of the human being in a 
generalising fashion (οὔτε γὰρ τὸ πάμπαν ἠέρα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον 
εἶναι, οὔτε πῦρ, οὔτε ὕδωρ, οὔτε γῆν, οὔτ᾿ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὅ τι μὴ 
φανερόν ἐστιν ἐνεὸν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ). If Diogenes was primarily at 
issue, it is very surprising that air as a unifiying substance is nowhere 
emphasised over the other three. Indeed any attempt to identify the 
specific examples Polybus might have had in mind seems to weaken 
the thoroughgoingness of his approach to the failure of monistic 
accounts. Crucially, the aim of the first chapter is explicitly general. 
It is not countering a monistic theory of monism that is attempted, 
but all monistic theories as representative of the failure of the type of 
 
12 Jouanna (1965, p. 321-2); Longrigg (1993, p. 88-9). 
13  Although the comparison between Diogenes’ B2 and the second chapter is 
striking, I am not fully convinced that Diogenes is as central as the 
Jouanna/Longrigg account has it. Polybus takes up different versions of monism in 
De natura hominis (see chapter 6 on ‘blood’) and any specific reference to 
Diogenes would most plausibly seem to be on the basis that he was representative 
of monism generally. 
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philosophical approach to medicine that Polybus regards as wrong-
headed. As such, assuming a central place for Diogenes seems prima 
facie unlikely and perhaps uncharitable to the argument we 
encounter. 
There is no also reason in this first chapter to suggest that the flaw 
identified needs to have its origin in the any specific commitment to 
monism as a thesis, as such. The monists overthrow themselves 
(ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν) not because they are monists but because 
their arguments are insufficient, unstable, and improperly divorced 
from what it is that they advocating. It is true that De natura hominis 
will attempt to counter any monistic approach to the human person 
by arguing for a plurality of humours and cures to disease. However, 
there is good reason to restrict the substance of the dialectic at this 
work’s start, including the reference to Melissus’ logos, to a 
methodological worry about how the monists’ arguments fail. On 
such an account, it the nature of arguments themselves that the 
monists are said to take up, and not the conclusion of such arguments, 
that is most crucially relevant. This has the virtue of attributing to 
Polybus an approach that attacks the very core of the philosophical 
perspective on medical matters. Let us see how this works. 
Polybus’ criticism may be roughly divided into two related strands, 
with the first more central to its structure than the second. (1) The 
monists argue for a single claim but give different arguments for the 
same conclusion (γνώμῃ μὲν γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ πάντες χρέονται, λέγουσι 
δὲ οὐ ταὐτά). (2) They seek to bolster their account with appendices 
(ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν γνώμης τὸν ἐπίλογον τὸν αὐτὸν ποιέονται). Both 
points are repeated twice in the chapter and the empirical appeal to 
the monists’ debates is clearly intended to demonstrate the instability 
of monism and the weakness of their method. Yet it is striking that 
Polybus’ approach does not turn significantly on the falsehood of 
monism itself but indirectly makes this point by attacking the means 
of arriving at such a conclusion. 
The concern is to be found prior to any claim about monism in 
Polybus’ understanding of the relation between an argument for a 
claim and the understanding of that claim. A single thesis, or claim, 
10 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03124. 
 
is to have a single account given on its behalf (γνώμῃ μὲν γὰρ τῇ αὐτῇ 
πάντες χρέονται, λέγουσι δὲ οὐ ταὐτά). Importantly, this account is 
itself sufficient to demonstrate that those that adopt it have 
knowledge of the relevant matter. It is also explicitly stated that the 
understanding of a particular idea can only be indicated by giving a 
single, correct account of that idea (ὁπότε δὲ γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ 
προσχρέονται, λέγουσι δ᾿ οὐ τὰ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ γινώσκουσιν 
αὐτά). However, the criteria that characterise the knower and their 
use of arguments go further. A consistent, correct account is not just 
a necessary and sufficient mark of knowledge; it is also to be 
understood as the exclusive correct account of that piece of 
knowledge. No alternative means of demonstrating some claim’s 
truth (i.e. its correctness) is possible, and no more comprehensive 
account desirable. On this line, attempts to buttress arguments with 
secondary evidence and proofs are indications of the failure of the 
primary demonstration (καὶ ἐπιλέγει ἕκαστος τῷ ἑωυτοῦ λόγῳ 
μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια, ἅ ἐστιν οὐδέν). 
What we should take away from this is that successful demonstration 
relies on adhering to the above understanding of how a λόγος 
adequately captures a γνώμη, understood as something like a claim 
or opinion.14 So then we need to make a distinction between the 
γνώμη itself as an opinion or judgement capable of demonstration, 
which may or may not rise to the level of knowledge or 
understanding,15 and the demonstration of that opinion (λόγος). This 
distinction is emphasised by the heavily verbal, oral depiction of 
λόγοι in this chapter. We begin with hearing and speaking (ἀκούειν 
λεγόντων) and conclude with an appeal to live debates as τεκμήρια 
 
14 Cf. De natura hominis, chapter 6 for further examples of this use γνώμη as claim, 
opinion, or judgement. 
15 Polybus uses various forms of γινώσκειν for ‘understanding’ in this passage. 
How might ‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding’ be understood by Polybus? At the very 
least, it is something that can be consistently translated into successful arguments 
(αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα) without the help of superficial blandishments (γλῶσσα 
ἐπιρρυεῖσα). 
 ESTABLISHING THE LOGOS OF MELISSUS 11 
 
of monistic ignorance; in between, the vocabulary of speaking is 
predominant (e.g. λέγειν, φάσκων, ἐπιλέγει). 
It seems probable that Polybus has an anti-rhetorical and, perhaps, 
anti-sophistical point in mind in criticising live debates as volatile 
and emblematic of a poor means at arriving at useful knowledge.16 
For our purposes, two distinctions we have identified in this passage 
are useful for identifying the value of Melissus’ mention within 
Polybus’ strategy, and how we might determine what is meant by his 
‘logos’. First, we have seen that he distinguishes between an 
argument sufficient to indicate the status of its adopter as a knower 
and further appendices (μαρτύριά τε καὶ τεκμήρια) added on to that 
argument which merely suggest the weakness of the primary 
demonstration. Second, Polybus is careful to keep a claim (γνώμη), 
i.e. a conclusion an argument purports to establish, separate from the 
argument or demonstration (λόγος) used in this effort. 
One might think that Polybus has a stringent and quite narrow 
understanding of what constitutes a sound argument which makes 
little allowance for the diversity of contexts in which a claim might 
be raised. We might be sceptical, for example, of the idea that any 
one conclusion has only a single, correlated argument that may be 
spoken on its behalf. The criticism of supplemental material is also 
suspect. Demonstrating that different premises result in the same 
conclusion is rhetorically powerful, but this need not suggest that 
such arguments themselves are unsound. 
Yet it is unclear that Polybus is generally committed to the 
implications of these criticisms beyond their value as indicators of 
the epistemic states of his targets. What I mean is that Polybus need 
not be understood as concerned to insist directly here that the thesis 
of monism is false or that a correct argument needs in every situation 
to conform to the considerations above. Rather Polybus is concerned 
with whether the monists’ arguments do, in fact, suggest that they 
 
16 Here we might compare the Hippocratic De arte; see Mann (2012) for discussion 
of the sophistical context of this work. 
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know what they claim to know. It is with this in mind that the status 
of the appeal to the live debates of the monists becomes clearer. 
It seems we are meant to believe that a correctly made argument on 
behalf of a genuine piece of knowledge should always prove 
victorious in debate (καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν 
ἀμφὶ τῶν πρηγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν 
ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἐόντα γινώσκει καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται). One might 
read this as suggesting that a correct account given of something true 
always proves victorious in debate, and this is difficult to 
countenance. Polybus’ account is normative (δίκαιόν) but only within 
the restrictive context of the monists’ debates, when the same 
debaters with the same audience (οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν 
ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων) are advocating for the same idea. In such 
circumstances, there should be consistent agreement about the 
argument because the same conclusion is sought within a group of 
self-proclaimed knowers of that conclusion. The diversity of 
approaches, as with the use of appendices or additional arguments, is 
suggestive, in such circumstances, of ignorance. 
What these debates prove then is not that a monistic view of the 
human being is incorrect but that its advocates do not understand 
what it is they are claiming. It is their status as self-proclaimed 
knowers that is targeted. This is suggested by Polybus’ framing of his 
empirical evidence. 
ὁπότε δὲ γνώμῃ τῇ αὐτῇ προσχρέονται, λέγουσι δ᾿ οὐ 
τὰ αὐτά, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ γινώσκουσιν αὐτά. γνοίη δ᾿ 
ἂν τόδε τις μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν 
ἀντιλέγουσιν 
The fact that, while adopting the same idea, they do 
not give the same account, shows that their knowledge 
too is at fault. The best way to realise this is to be 
present at their debates. 
(De natura hominis, chapter 1. text and trans. Jones 
(1923)) 
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Jones’s ‘their knowledge too is at fault’ for οὐδὲ γινώσκουσιν αὐτά 
leaves open the implication that it is what the monists know (or claim 
to know) that is at fault. But this is not Polybus’ contention. It is that 
the monists do not know which he undertakes to demonstrate, and the 
verb γινώσκουσιν makes this beyond doubt. On this reading, the 
appeal to the debate is simply the best means (μάλιστα) of 
determining how ignorant the advocates of monism really are. As 
such, there is something unmistakeably ad hominem about Polybus’ 
strategy insofar as it is the epistemic states of his targets and not their 
thesis that is attacked. Yet there is notable persuasive power in 
suggesting that your opponent is not actually committed to the claim 
they make. It also worth emphasising that the strategy of this first 
chapter of De natura hominis is preparing the ground for Polybus’ 
extensive investigation into the plural humours of the person. A 
suggestive rather than determinative polemic might be all that was 
desired. 
How does this help us understand the value of the appeal to Melissus? 
At the very least, we should be very surprised if λόγος shifted its 
meaning in the chapter to refer to his monism specifically and not his 
argument(s) for such a position. Rather Polybus’ monist disputants 
are said to set up Melissus’ λόγος, understood as his means of 
establishing monism. They do so by overthrowing themselves in their 
discussion (καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν). What 
does this mean? As we have seen, Polybus has established above the 
criteria for judging the arguments of those who make a claim to 
knowledge of the constitution of the person. These focused on the use 
of different, multiple arguments for the same conclusion, both 
interpersonally in debate, and intrapersonally in the use of appendices 
(ἐπίλογοι). If this right, the best place to look I suggest is Melissus’ 
B8. 
Initial support for the relevance of this fragment to Polybus’ 
argument is suggested by their shared interest in correct 
understanding (ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν) and how this is achieved. As we 
have seen, for Polybus this is signalled by the use of complete, 
demonstrative, stable arguments without the need for additional 
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support. A focus on correct understanding and correct demonstration 
(ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται) is a hallmark of Polybus’ polemic. For 
Melissus, a similar focus on correctness is concerned with the results 
of sense perception (ὀρθῶς ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούομεν; ὀρθῶς ὁρᾶν καὶ 
ἀκούειν καὶ συνιέναι; ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἑωρῶμεν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πολλὰ 
ὀρθῶς δοκεῖ εἶναι) and their failure to conform with what each thing 
must be. 17  This interest is confined to B8 in our collection of 
fragments. 
Crucially, this fragment is explicitly supplemental to Melissus’ main 
demonstration of what-is, as he makes clear in the first line of the 
text: μέγιστον μὲν οὖν σημεῖον οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἓν μόνον ἔστιν· 
ἀτὰρ καὶ τάδε σημεῖα.18 What B8 adds is an additional argument or 
indication that tackles plurality negatively in an attempt to eliminate 
it as a truly applied predicate of what-is; his other demonstrations 
have attempted to argue for its substantive, positive description (as 
sempiternal, unique, exhaustive of what there is, motionless etc.). 
This is achieved by taking up for consideration, hypothetically and 
per impossibile, the thought that there is a plurality and then 
attempting to show that each item in this plurality must conform with 
 
17 For a Hippocratic approach opposed to Melissus on the relationship between 
understanding and sense perception, see De arte, chap 2: δοκέει δή μοι τὸ μὲν 
σύμπαν τέχνη εἶναι οὐδεμία οὐκ ἐοῦσα· καὶ γὰρ ἄλογον τῶν ἐόντων τι ἡγεῖσθαι μὴ 
ἐόν· ἐπεὶ τῶν γε μὴ ἐόντων τίνα ἂν τίς οὐσίην θεησάμενος ἀπαγγείλειεν ὡς ἔστιν; 
εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔστι γ’ ἰδεῖν τὰ μὴ ἐόντα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐόντα, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἄν τις αὐτὰ 
νομίσειε μὴ ἐόντα, ἅ γε εἴη καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖν καὶ γνώμῃ νοῆσαι ὥς ἐστιν· ἀλλ’ 
ὅπως μὴ οὐκ ᾖ τοῦτο τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἐόντα αἰεὶ ὁρᾶταί τε καὶ γινώσκεται, 
τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐόντα οὔτε ὁρᾶται οὔτε γινώσκεται. (Mann). The overlap in language here 
with B8 suggests a direct response. Finding the relevance of Eleaticism in this 
chapter is a common theme in the literature; see Mann (2012, p. 25), Taylor (1911, 
p. 225) and Hankinson (1998, p. 77). 
18 I discuss some of the interpretative approaches to this fragment in Harriman 
(2018, p. 194-215). One might, with Reinhardt (1916, p. 71-4), wish to compare 
this fragment with the second half of Parmenides’ poem. Perhaps both work to 
establish further their respective presentations of what-is. Yet Melissus’ argument 
is presented in very different terms as supplemental but still useful, and in no way 
as deceptive, as on Parmenides’ line. It also been debated whether Melissus had a 
cosmology (now lost) that compared with Parmenides’. See Bicknell (1982) and 
Palmer (2001) for discussion. 
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his previous description of what-is: εἰ γὰρ ἦν πολλά, τοιαῦτα χρὴ 
αὐτὰ εἶναι οἷόν περ ἐγώ φημι τὸ ἓν εἶναι. 
The strategy here is partly concessive. Melissus must put off to one 
side some features he has attributed to what-is (uniqueness and 
exhautiveness) to even entertain the possibility of a plurality. Yet it 
is clear that this is hypothetically done to reinforce other predicates 
(sempiternity and the absence of change) he has earlier applied. It is 
on this basis that entities such as ‘earth, water, air, fire, iron and gold, 
and one thing living and another dead, and black and white, and all 
the things people say are real’ can be considered and Melissus can 
make the argument that each must be as they first appeared if they 
are truly real. Then the results of sense perception may be exploited 
to show that there is a contradiction inherent to the pluralist position. 
However we make sense of this contradiction,19 Melissus’ approach 
is partial and dialectical in its attempt to support a conclusion at the 
very least adjacent, if not at odds with, the main argument of his book. 
The fragment concludes as follows: 
ἢν δὲ μεταπέσῃ, τὸ μὲν ἐὸν ἀπώλετο, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν 
γέγονεν. οὕτως οὖν, εἰ πολλὰ εἴη, τοιαῦτα χρὴ εἶναι 
οἷόν περ τὸ ἕν. 
But being changed, what-is is destroyed, and what-is-
not has come to be. Therefore, if there were many, 
they ought to be of just the same sort as the One is. 
Melissus does not explicitly extend the scope of this argument to 
support his monism. Rather B8 establishes what a plurality would 
minimally entail and leaves the reader to work out whether accepting 
a plurality on such terms is consistent with their motivation (i.e. the 
results of sense perception) for raising the possibility in the first 
place. Jonathan Barnes has put this point well: ‘The man who 
pretends to place some trust in his senses and yet believes that the 
 
19 Some have located the contradiction at the level of change, e.g. Barnes (1982, p. 
299-301). I have argued in Harriman (2018, p. 202-211) that it is through sense 
perception itself that the pluralists commit to plural entities, but in doing so rely on 
illicitly on the changeable, unstable senses, which do not reveal what is real. 
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world is an unchanging place can hardly be taken seriously. Partisans 
of the senses must not believe everything their favourites tell them.’20 
This leaves, as Barnes notes, Melissus with the following sort of 
argument against the pluralists: (a) they believe that many things 
exist; (b) there is no reason to believe that many things exist. Such an 
argument is indirect. Monism is not firmly established, but Melissus 
has managed to argue for the superiority of his rational method of 
deducing the predicates of what-is independent of the unreliable and 
contradictory results of sense perception. 
If this interpretation is along the right lines, B8 is an excellent 
example of the supplemental arguments Polybus attacks in De natura 
hominis. The fragment is explicitly an additional proof provided to 
shore up support for the main series of deductions found in the 
remainder of Melissus’ fragments. The argument in B8 is ingenious, 
but it is also partial, indirect, and dialectically constructed. In short, 
it is exactly the sort of argument that indicates for Polybus, fairly or 
unfairly, an uncertain grasp of the truth and the correct means of 
demonstrating this. Its existence overthrows Melissus’ claim to 
knowledge. 
Finally, we can begin to see how Polybus’ disputants establish 
Melissus’ logos. ὀρθοῦν should not be understood as a success verb, 
implying that these monists managed to set right what Melissus’ 
argument entails. Rather the point is conative. The monists overthrow 
themselves in the attempt to take up Melissus’ argumentative 
strategy, succesfully or unsuccessfully. We need not, and should not, 
assume that Polybus took such monists establish anything substantial 
about Melissus. Rather it is within their own words and discussions, 
Polybus insists, that his targets undermine themselves and indicate 
their failure to grasp what it is they claim to know. Adopting 
Melissus’ strategy of supplemental argumentation is the source of 
their failure and the indicator of their ignorance. 
 
20 Barnes, 1982, p. 236. 
 ESTABLISHING THE LOGOS OF MELISSUS 17 
 
It is worth noting that there is a notable overlap between these two 
arguments. Perhaps Polybus is not offering this first chapter as 
supplemental in the way Melissus does, yet both aim for conclusions 
that are ultimately indirect and suggestive rather than probative. 
Polybus has not shown that the monists are wrong to adopt such a 
position, but simply that their means of demonstration are self-
undermining and point to their ignorance and illicit intrusion into 
medicine. The monists then cannot be reasonably thought knowers 
and their conclusions irrelevant to the human person. Melissus’ 
argument achieves much the same result. Pluralism is not eliminated 
from contention, but its advocates are shown to have no good reason 
to adopt such a position, resulting in something bearing a close 
resemblance to the claim that this view is self-undermining. Having 
no good reason to believe p and believing p at the very least 
approaches contradiction. We might then ask whether Polybus has 
fallen into his own trap by offering the epistemically centred 
argument we have attributed to him. Would someone who knew 
monism was false confine himself to such an indirect argument? I 
leave this question open. 
I conclude by offering one final suggestion on the impact of 
Melissus’ use of the strategy of supplemental argument.21  I have 
noted above that Gorgias’ Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως seems to 
be a deliberate perversion of the title of Melissus’ book, Περὶ φύσεως 
ἢ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. We might extend this comparison to the structure 
of Gorgias’ work. Sextus summarises as follows: 
Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντῖνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος 
ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀνῃρηκόσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὐ κατὰ τὴν 
ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ 
τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως 
 
21 It is worth noting that B8, although clearly the most prominent example in 
Melissus’ fragments of this strategy, is far from the only example. B6 on 
uniqueness seems a supplemental, hypothetical consideration of a predicate already 
deduced in B4 and B5. The fascinating example of a change by a single hair in B7 
also may be best read as a vividly presented, supplemental argument intended to 
reinforce Melissus’ more direct arguments targeting alteration on the basis of the 
impossibility of generation from what-is-not. 
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τρία κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἓν μὲν καὶ 
πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, 
ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, 
ἀλλά τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. 
Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same party as 
those who abolish the criterion, although he did not 
adopt the same line of attack as Protagoras. For in his 
book entitled Concerning the Non-
existent or Concerning Nature he tries to establish 
successively three main points—firstly, that nothing 
exists; secondly, that even if anything exists it is 
inapprehensible by man; thirdly, that even if anything 
is apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible and 
incommunicable to one’s neighbour. (Sextus 
Empiricus, Adv. Math. VII.65) Text and Trans. R.G. 
Bury. 
The three-part structure Sextus describes is surely different in kind 
from Melissus’ B8, or the appendices Polybus criticises. A single, 
primary thesis is not treated to different attempts at demonstration; 
Gorgias’ approach is destructive. However, the structure of multiple, 
more or less independent, concessive arguments, does seem to 
establish a link with Melissus and Polybus’s disputants. 
Melissus has been called as eristic, best understood in the context of 
sophistry.22 Perhaps this overstates the point and unfairly distances 
Melissus from a commitment to his arguments. However, that the 
structure of Melissus’ book had a significant influence on the 
construction of the arguments of the sophists seems a plausible thesis 
and further secured by Polybus’ understanding of Melissus’ logos. 
His disputants, in attempting to establish Melissus’ logos, are 
demonstrate the extent of his impact, and it is notable that this is 
independent of his monism. 
 
22 See Palmer (2009). 
 ESTABLISHING THE LOGOS OF MELISSUS 19 
 
Bibliography 
BARNES, J. (1982). The Presocratic Philosophers. London, 
Routledge. 
BICKNELL, P. (1982). Melissus’ way of seeming? Phronesis 27, p. 
194–201. 
BURY, R.G. (1935) Sextus Empiricus. Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Logicians. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. 
FURLEY, D. (1967) Two Studies in the Greek 
Atomists. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
GUTHRIE, W. K. C. (1965). A History of Greek Philosophy. 
Volume II. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
GRAHAM, D. W. (2010). The Texts of Early Greek 
Philosophy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
HANKINSON, R. J. (1998) Cause and Explanation in Greek 
Thought. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
HARRIMAN, B. (2015). The Beginning of Melissus’ On Nature, or 
On What-is: A Reconstruction. Journal of Hellenic Studies 135, p. 
19–34. 
HARRIMAN, B. (2018) Melissus and Eleatic Monism. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
JONES, W. H. S. (1923). Hippocrates. Volume I I . Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
JOUANNA, J. (1965). Rapports entre Mélissos de Samos et Diogène 
d’Apollonie, à la lumière du traité hippocratique De natura 
hominis. Revue des Études Anciennes 67, p.306–23. 
JOUANNA, J. (2012). The Legacy of the Hippocratic Treatise The 
Nature of Man: The Theory of the Four Humours. In: ALLIES, N. 
(ed.) Greek Medicine from Hippocrates to Galen: Selected Papers. 
Leiden, Brill, p. 335-360. 
LONGRIGG, J. (1993). Greek Rational Medicine: Philosophy and 
Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians. London, Routledge. 
20 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03124. 
 
MAKIN, S. (2014). Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. In: WARREN, 
J.; SHEFFIELD, F. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Ancient 
Philosophy. London, Routledge, p. 34–48. 
MANN, J. (2012). Hippocrates, On the Art of Medicine. Leiden, 
Brill. 
MEWALDT, J.; HELMREICH, G.; WESTENBERGER, J. (1914). 
Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, V. 9, 1. Galeni in Hippocratis de 
Natura Hominis, in Hipporatis de Victu Acutorum, de Diaeta 
Hippocratis in Morbis Acutis. Berlin, B.G. Teubner. 
PALMER, J. (2001). A New Testimonium on Diogenes of Apollonia, 
with Remarks on Melissus’ Cosmology. Classical Quarterly 51, p. 
7-17. 
PALMER, J. (2004). Melissus and Parmenides. Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy 26, p. 19–54. 
PALMER, J. (2009). Parmenides and Presocratic 
Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
REALE, G. (1970). Melisso: Testimonianze e 
frammenti. Florence, La Nuova Italia. 
REINHARDT, K. (1916). Parmenides und die Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophie. Bonn, Friedrich Cohen. 
TAYLOR, A.E. (1911). Varia Socratica. Oxford, J. Parker. 
 
 
Submitted in 01/05/2021 and accepted for publication 01/08/2021 
 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 
 
 
Do you wish to submit a paper to Archai Journal? Please, access 
http://www.scielo.br/archai and learn our Submission Guidelines. 
 ESTABLISHING THE LOGOS OF MELISSUS 21 
 
 
 
 
